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NOTES
EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT AND THE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE OF "AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE"
GIAN BROWN*
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1991' amended and redefined2 the protections
Congress created in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII").3 Title VII specifically targets-and has profoundly changed-the
workplace.4 The 1991 amendment expands the remedies available to
promote Title VI's two primary goals: the prohibition of employment
discrimination' and the restoration of injured employees to their pre-dis-
crimination position.6 Equitable remedies7 are no longer the only means
of thwarting such discrimination. By providing for compensatory dam-
ages, punitive damages, and jury trials, employment discrimination
claims now resemble traditional tort claims.'
Employers often combat employment discrimination claims with the
affirmative defense of "after-acquired evidence,"9 i.e., evidence of em-
* I thank Professor Manuel del Valle, Chief Administrative Law Judge, New York
State Division of Human Rights, for his assistance with this Note.
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
2. For a discussion of this redefinition, see infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
4. See George P. Sape & Thomas J. Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 824, 825-29 (1972); Francis J.
Vaas, Title VIL: Legislative History, 7 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 431, 431-32 (1966).
5. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-30 (1971); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and
the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 17, 97-
98 (1991).
6. See Firefighters Local No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1984); Albemarle,
422 U.S. at 418. See also Jennifer M. Follette, Note, Complete Justice: Upholding the
Principles of Title VII Through Appropriate Treatment of After-Acquired Evidence, 68
Wash. L. Rev. 651, 652 (1993) (arguing that Congress's national policy against discrimi-
nation "embodies both a deterrent goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace
and a remedial goal of providing relief to discrimination victims").
7. For a discussion of the distinction between Title VII's legal and equitable reme-
dies, see infra notes 37-43, 84-94 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
9. See Francis J. Connell, III, Emerging Defenses to Employment Discrimination
Claims: After-Acquired Evidence and Stray Remarks, in Employment Litigation 1993, at
267, 270 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 464, 1993); Eliza-
beth P. Johnson, After-Acquired Evidence of Employee Misconduct: Affirmative Defense
or Limitation on Remedies?, 67 Fla. B.J. 76, 76 (June 1993). This Note supplements and
develops previous Notes that discuss this affirmative defense. See Follette, supra note 6;
William M. Muth, Jr., Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII Cases and
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ployee misconduct uncovered by employers during the suit's discovery
phase. While this misconduct would have served as a lawful reason for
the employee's discharge, 10 it cannot serve as a "cause" since the em-
ployer did not know of it at the time of the discharge." Most courts,
however, dismiss the employee's suit on the ground that the misconduct
precludes any form of relief, even if the employer actually discrimi-
nated. 2 Thus, the employer evades liability despite its discriminatory
conduct. In that sense, therefore, the term is inaccurate, because what
the employer actually "after-acquires" is an affirmative defense. 3
Two forms of this affirmative defense exist. In wrongful discharge
suits involving post-hiring misconduct, employers claim that they would
have fired the employee had they known of the misconduct at the time of
the discharge. 4 Alternatively, employers in wrongful refusal to hire
suits argue that they would not have hired the employee had they learned
of the misconduct. 15 In wrongful discharge suits involving pre-hiring
misconduct, employers set forth both of these arguments-that they
either would have fired the employee upon learning of such evidence or
would never have hired the employee in the first place. 6
The federal courts disagree over the appropriate response to the em-
the Challenge Presented by Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (lth Cir.
1992), 72 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1993); Brian J. King, Survey, The Use of After-Acquired
Resume Fraud as a Defense to Discrimination Claims: Washington v. Lake County, Illi-
nois, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 406 (1993); Hugh Lawson, 11, Casenote, Wallace v. Dunn Con-
struction Co.- Defining the Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Federal Employment
Discrimination Suits, 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1469 (1993).
10. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 1992);
Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Honey-
well Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 606 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 515, 519 (D. Kan. 1991); Punahele v. United Air Lines, 756 F. Supp. 487, 490 (D.
Colo. 1991); Grzenia v. Interspec, Inc., No. 91 C 290, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15093, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 1991); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge Misconduct
Discovered After an Employees' Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1990).
11. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
12. See id.
13. For a discussion of the nature of affirmative defenses, see infra notes 100-02 and
accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Summers, 864 F.2d at 703 (employee would have been fired for fraud
that occurred while plaintiff was employed); Mackey v. Board of Pensions of the United
Methodist Church, No. 91 Civ. 5739, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 424, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
14, 1993) (employee would have been fired for unauthorized removal of files during em-
ployment); Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1225, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (employee would have been discharged for falsifying a group
insurance application and an insurance claim); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter
Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D. Ariz. 1992) (employee would have been terminated for
unauthorized removal of files).
15. See Punahele v. United Air Lines, 756 F. Supp. 487, 488-89 (D. Colo. 1991).
16. See Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1992); John-
son v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992); Churchman v. Pinkerton's
Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D. Kan. 1991).
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
ployer's affirmative defense of "after-acquired evidence." 7 The majority
approach bars an employee from any relief despite the occurrence of dis-
crimination because the misconduct prevents the recognition of any legal
injury for which a remedy may be granted.' 8 These courts dismiss the
employee's suit. But this result actually permits the employer to benefit
from its discrimination.' 9
The minority approach recognizes that the employee was indeed in-
jured and refuses to dismiss the cause of action. Once the court finds that
the employee suffered a Title VII injury, it then separately considers
which remedies should be granted in light of this misconduct.20 The em-
ployer bears the burden of persuasion for showing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, whether and in what manner the employee misconduct
would have lawfully altered the employment relationship. 2' These courts
have proposed two alternative views on the issue of back pay awards-
some award back pay up until the date of the court's judgment,2 while
others limit recovery to the date the employer actually learned of the
misconduct.' The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission es-
pouses the minority approach and the view that back pay should be
awarded until the date that the employer actually discovered the em-
ployee misconduct. 24
This Note considers the use of the "after-acquired evidence" defense in
wrongful discharge and wrongful refusal to hire actions. Part I examines
the changes Title VII brought to the common law regarding employment
discrimination, details the impact of amendments to Title VII, and gives
an overview of the steps necessary to prove employer liability. Part II
presents the issues raised by wrongful discharge suits involving either
post-hiring misconduct or pre-hiring misconduct, and wrongful refusal
to hire suits involving pre-hiring misconduct. It also discusses the major-
ity and minority approaches employed by the courts, as well as the mi-
nority approach's two views on back pay damages. Part III argues that
17. See Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir.
1992), cert granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993); Wallace v.
Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 1992); Moodie v. Federal Reserve
Bank, No. 91 CIV. 6629 (MEL), 1993 WL 370582, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993); Bray
v. Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 115, 118 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Donald R.
Livingston, Revised EEOC General Counsel's Memo on Civil Rights Act of 1991 U.&
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Daily Labor Report, Mar. 4, 1993, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 41 DLR F-I, 1993 [hereinafter "Revised EEOC Memorandum"].
18. For a discussion of the majority approach, see infra notes 109-34 and accompany-
ing text.
19. See discussion infra part III.A.
20. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181-84; Moodie, 1993 WL 370582, at *3. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission espouses this approach. See infra notes 158-62
and accompanying text.
21. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181 n.l1; Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino,
828 F. Supp. 314, 328 (D.N.J. 1993).
22. See infra notes 151, 154-57 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 154-57.
24. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
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the majority approach to wrongful discharge suits involving the affirma-
tive defense of "after-acquired evidence" is fundamentally flawed because
it allows an employer to benefit from information that it discovered only
as a result of its discrimination. Instead, the minority approach, coupled
with a case-by-case evaluation of available remedies, more fully satisfies
the purposes of Title VII by properly recognizing that employee miscon-
duct should not shield an employer's discrimination. This Note con-
cludes that only the minority approach avoids giving either the employee
or the employer a windfall while satisfying Title VII's goals-eliminating
discrimination in the workplace and restoring injured employees to their
pre-discrimination positions.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Under the common law, an employer could terminate an employee at
will25 "'for good cause, for no cause or even for a cause morally
wrong.' "26 Courts admitted evidence of an employee's misconduct
whether or not the employer knew of such evidence at the time of the
discharge.27 In fact, an employer could rely on one reason as cause at the
time of dismissal but later justify such dismissal by relying on an entirely
different ground.28
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 changed the common law
by expressly prohibiting employers from discharging, refusing to hire, or
otherwise discriminating against any individual because of his or her
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 30 Through this legislation,
Congress sought to ensure equal employment opportunities for all per-
sons by eliminating discriminatory barriers in the workplace,3' and by
25. "At-will" refers to employees who may be fired for any reason or no reason. See
Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
26. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 2-9(a)(2), at 61
(3d ed. 1987) (quoting Payne v. Western & A.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), over-
ruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)).
27. See Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 412-13 (6th Cir. 1992);
Benson v. Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1992);
Bradley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 48, 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), vacated in part,
486 N.W.2d 737 (Mich. 1992); Muth, supra note 11, at 332.
28. See Johnson, 955 F.2d at 412; Benson, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 746;
Bradley, 486 N.W.2d at 50; see also 53 Am. Jur. 2d Master & Servant § 46 (1970) ("If
legal grounds for the dismissal of an employee during the term of his employment exist,
no importance attaches to the motive which may have actuated the employer in making
the dismissal.").
29. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1988 & Supp. III 1991).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
31. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982); Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
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making employees and job applicants whole for injuries suffered due to
an employer's discriminatory employment practices.32 Consistent with
these goals, Title VII expressly provided for causes of action against em-
ployers by employees for wrongful discharge or prospective employees
for wrongful refusal to hire.33
Congress also extended plenary powers to the courts 4 to" 'fashion the
most complete relief possible,' "-3 in order for them to render decisions
that would, as much as possible, eliminate past discrimination and bar
future discrimination.36 Title VII originally granted courts a discretion-
ary choice of equitable remedies. 37 The statute expressly authorized en-
joining an employer from engaging in discriminatory activity38 and
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
Congress intended that the fight against employment discrimination "be a policy 'of
the highest priority.'" Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 507 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968)); see also Franks, 424 U.S. at 763 (same). This policy benefits employers, employ-
ees, and consumers because it promotes both efficiency and trustworthy workmanship.
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
32. See Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 230; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418.
33. See eg., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (providing enforcement
provisions).
34. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45. This extension of power was consistent with Con-
gress's intention that the federal courts have the final responsibility for enforcing Title
VII. See iL at 44. Broad compliance with the law is also achieved, in part, through
private litigation because enforcement of Title VII is so difficult to monitor. See EEOC v.
Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 602-03 & n.21 (1981); Newman, 390 U.S. at
401; see also Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45 ("IT]he private right of action remains an essential
means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII."). Thus, attorney's fees assist a
plaintiff in her important role as a "private attorney general." Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (providing discretionary power to award reasonable at-
torney's fees).
35. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7168 (1972) (statement
of Sen. Williams)).
36. See id, at 418 (citing Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)). Title
VII, then, prohibits "an entire socio-economic structure of conduct." Gudel, supra note
5, at 98.
37. Traditionally, courts drew a distinction between legal and equitable remedies.
Legal remedies consisted of monetary damages for injuries that had already occurred,
while equitable remedies empowered courts to prevent future illegal actions and to craft
relief to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case. See IA C.J.S. Actions § 124
(1985). In many states today, both legal and equitable remedies are available in one form
of action. See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 4 (1966). The law has not forgotten, however, this
distinction between remedies. While equitable actions were traditionally tried by a court
without a jury, only juries generally granted legal relief. See id.
Title VII initially only provided the traditional equitable remedies of injunction and
reinstatement. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, 261 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III 1991)). As such, the statute conferred jurisdiction to hear viola-
tions of the statute upon "[e]ach United States district court ... [for] actions brought
under [Title VII]," § 706(f) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(3) (Supp. III 1991)),
which Congress later specifically limited the hearing of these cases to judges only, see
Pub. L. No. 92-261, Sec. 4, § 706(0(4), 86 Stat. 103, 106 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(4) (1988)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 subsequently changed this. See
infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
38. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, 261 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (Supp. III 1991)).
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ordering the reinstatement of an employee or the hiring of a prospective
employee with or without back pay.39 Reasonable attorney's fees could
also be awarded.' The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 19721,
amended Title VII and greatly expanded the remedies available by ex-
pressly authorizing the use of any appropriate equitable relief.42 But the
1972 amendment restricted accrual of back pay awards to not more than
two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.43
Title VII's reach, however, is limited. While the statute proscribes em-
ployment decisions based on discriminatory factors, it also prohibits pref-
erences for a particular group based upon those same factors." For
example, Title VII does not guarantee jobs to persons simply because
they are minorities.45 It also does not compel employers to rehire em-
ployees who have engaged in deliberate, unlawful activities against
them.46 Rather, Title VII strikes a balance between the desire to pre-
serve an employer's freedom of choice and the quest to eliminate certain
discriminatory bases for distinguishing among employees.47
39. See id. Back pay is measured by determining what the employee would have
earned had the discrimination not occurred, minus any amounts that the employee actu-
ally did earn. See Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989).
40. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, 261 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
41. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)) [hereinafter the 1972 Act].
42. See id. § 4 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)). Congress specifically intended
that this expansion of equitable power would aid the court's mission of "fashion[ing] the
most complete relief possible." 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7168 (1972).
On March 6, 1972, Senator Williams delivered a section-by-section analysis of the 1972
Act that had been agreed to by the Conference Committee of the House and Senate on
February 29, 1972 (the "Conference Report"). See id. at 7166. The Conference Report
explained the major provisions of the 1972 Act. See id. The Senate agreed to the Confer-
ence Report by a vote of 62 to 10, with 28 not voting. See id. at 7170; see also Sape &
Hart, supra note 4, at 880 ("Notwithstanding th[e] ... limitation [of back pay awards to
the two year period prior to the filing of a discrimination charge with the EEOC], the
general intention of Congress in adopting the 1972 Amendments was to provide for broad
and effective remedies.").
The 1972 Act also provided that the case law that courts had developed through the
time of the Act's enactment would continue to govern the applicability and construction
of Title VII in those areas that were not addressed by the 1972 Act, or for which Con-
gress had not expressed a contrary intention. See 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7166 (1972).
43. See Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 4, 86 Stat. at 107 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(1) (1988 & Supp. III)); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 420 &
n.13 (1975); Sape & Hart, supra note 4, at 880.
44. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703 (j), 78 Stat. 253, 257 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j)); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 581 (1984);
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981); Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
45. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31.
46. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973).
47. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239, 242 (1989).
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B. Determining Employer Liability
An employee may use either direct or indirect evidence to prove that
an employer's employment decision resulted from discrimination.48 The
Supreme Court developed two different methods to determine whether
evidence asserted by a plaintiff proves an employer's liability. The
pretextual analysis evaluates the plaintiff's indirect evidence and consid-
ers whether the single "true" motive behind the employment decision
was unlawful under Title VII.4 Alternatively, the mixed motive analysis
evaluates either the plaintiff's direct or indirect evidence when the em-
ployment decision resulted from more than one reason, one of which was
lawful.50
1. The Pretextual Analysis
Under the pretextual analysis, the plaintiff must establish aprimafacie
case of discrimination through the use of circumstantial, indirect evi-
dence."1 The Supreme Court's pretextual analysis involves a three-step
process of shifting the burden of production between the employee and
the employer.5 2 This process enables a court to determine whether a law-
ful or a discriminatory reason motivated a particular employment
practice.53
Under this analysis, the employee bears the initial burden of establish-
ing aprimafacie case of discrimination. 4 She must show "actions taken
by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unex-
plained, that it is more likely than not that such actions" resulted from
unlawful employment practices. 55  The Supreme Court, in McDonnell
48. See Puhy v. Delta Air Lines, No. 1:91-CV-1630-RCF, 1993 WL 405426, at 02
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1993). A statement by a hiring decisionmaker that "if it were his
company he would not hire blacks" exemplifies direct evidence. EEOC v. Alton Packag-
ing Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 924 (1lth Cir. 1990); see also Puhy, 1993 WL 405426, at *2
("Only the most blatant remarks whose intent could be nothing other than to discrimi-
nate constitute direct evidence."); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Decision
No. 915-002, 1992 WL 189088, at *6 (E.E.O.C. July 14, 1992) [hereinafter "EEOC 1992
Decision"]. Plaintiffs rely on indirect evidence more often because blatantly discrimina-
tory policies are unlikely to exist anymore. Cf United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Gover-
nors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) ("There will seldom be 'eye~vitness' testimony as
to the employer's mental processes.").
49. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (Vhite, J., concurring).
50. See id at 260-261.
51. See Alton Packaging, 901 F.2d at 923. For a discussion of the distinction between
direct and indirect evidence in Title VII cases, see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text.
52. See Saint Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993).
53. See e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8
(1981) (holding that the shifting of burdens is intended "progressively to sharpen the
inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination"). The pretextual
approach therefore enables a plaintiff to prove discrimination by solely relying on circum-
stantial evidence. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
55. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
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56Douglas Corp. v. Green, suggested the following model to establish a
prima facie case: (i) the plaintiff must belong to a protected class; (ii) the
plaintiff must have been qualified for the job; (iii) the plaintiff must have
been denied employment despite her qualifications; and (iv) after the em-
ployer's rejection of the plaintiff, the position must have remained open
and the employer must have continued to seek applications from people
equally as qualified for the position as the plaintiff.5 7 This four-part Mc-
Donnell Douglas model, however, was intended to be flexible; the Court
has repeatedly recognized that each part is not necessarily applicable to
every factual situation."
A prima facie case of discrimination creates a presumption of unlawful
discrimination,59 which then shifts the burden of production to the em-
ployer to assert any lawful, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employ-
ment decision.6 But the employer need only raise a genuine issue of fact
as to whether it discriminated. Because the ultimate burden of persua-
sion always rests with the employee, the employer does not have to prove
that the proffered reasons actually motivated it.61
If the employer successfully articulates a lawful, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action, the employee may rebut this reason by demonstrat-
ing that the reason was pretextual.62 A reason is a pretext if it serves as a
"cover-up" for a decision,63 and discrimination was the real reason for
the employer's action."4 In order to prove pretext, the employee must
show that a proscribed reason, and not the proffered reason, motivated
the employment decision.65
2. The Mixed Motive Analysis
Direct evidence of discrimination establishes both a prima facie case
56. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
57. See id. at 802.
58. See id. at 802 n.13; United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 715 (1983); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
n.6 (1981); Furnco, 438 U.S. at 575-76; McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 279 n.6 (1976). In fact, McDonnell Douglas dealt with a discriminatory hiring
claim, so some flexibility is necessary in order to embrace claims of wrongful discharge.
See, e.g., Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1318 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989) (argu-
ing that job performance becomes the dominant concern in discharge cases under Mc-
Donnell Douglas).
59. See Saint Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993).
60. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
61. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
62. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751-52; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
578 (1978); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
63. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
64. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752. Lower courts have held that pretext may be proven
by showing "that the employer, more likely than not, was motivated by a discriminatory
reason . . . ." Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Ctr., 928 F.2d 973, 977 (10th Cir.
1991); see Lee v. National Can Corp., 699 F.2d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 845 (1983).
65. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
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and liability66 unless the employer impeaches the plaintiff's direct evi-
dence or advances an affirmative defense.6 Mixed motive suits involve
situations where more than one reason led to the employment decision.
Unlike pretextual suits, there is no single "true" motive in mixed motive
suits. Rather, the employer's decision resulted from at least one lawful,
and at least one unlawful, reason.6" Therefore, the question becomes not
whether a single "true" motive was unlawful, but rather whether one of
the true motives, standing alone, would have sufficed as a lawful reason
for the employment decision.69
a. Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle
The Supreme Court's mixed motive analysis developed outside of the
context of Title VII. In Mount Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle,70 an employee was discharged in part for a constitu-
tionally prohibited reason and in part for a lawful reason.7 The dis-
charge would have been justified if the employer's lawful reason had been
the sole basis for the discharge.72 Therefore, once the employee had
shown that the constitutionally prohibited reason played a role in the
decision to discharge, the Supreme Court shifted the burden to the em-
ployer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the discharge,
hypothetically, would still have occurred solely on account of the lawful
reason.
73
According to the Court, any constitutional principle at stake would be
"sufficiently vindicated" so long as the employee was not placed in a
worse position74 than he would have been in had he not engaged in the
protected conduct." Therefore, courts would not resolve the employ-
ment question against a "borderline or marginal candidate" based on his
66. See EEOC 1992 Decision, supra note 48, at *6.
67. See id
68. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989) (White, J., concur-
ring); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 319 n.5 (D.NJ.
1993).
69. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
71. See id at 281-83. The defendant, a school board, had fired the plaintiff, a school
teacher, for a "lack of tact in handling professional matters .... " Id. at 283 n. I. The
board based this decision on two separate incidents: (1) the teacher's use of an obscene
gesture to correct students in a cafeteria incident, and (2) the teacher's conveyance of a
dress code memorandum to a local radio disk jockey, who broadcasted the memorandum
as a news item. See id at 282-83 & n.l. The district court held that the First Amend-
ment protected the conveyance of the memorandum. See id. at 283.
72. See id at 285.
73. See id at 287; NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403
(1983).
74. For example, if the plaintiff would not have lost his job but for a constitutionally
prohibited reason, his discharge places him in a worse position than he would have been
in had the prohibited reason not arisen. Conversely, if he would have been fired anyway
based upon another concurrent and lawful reason, then the employer's reliance on the
constitutionally prohibited reason was essentially irrelevant.
75. See Mt Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86.
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constitutionally protected conduct.76 At the same time, his employer
could still decide not to rehire him on the basis of his performance record
even if his protected conduct convinced the employer that its decision
was correct."
b. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
The Supreme Court applied Mt. Healthy's mixed motive analysis to a
Title VII action in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.78 The Court held that
an employer would not be liable for an employment decision that was
based in part on a discriminatory reason if it proved, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that it would have reached the same decision solely on
account of a lawful reason.79 A reason would be considered lawful
if matters of race, religion, color, gender, or national origin were
irrelevant.80
The inquiry under the mixed motive analysis became whether the em-
ployer considered at least one lawful reason when it made the employ-
ment decision.8" An employer would only prevail if a lawful and
sufficient reason in fact motivated its actions at the time of the decision.82
Evidence that an employer's decision may have been justified was irrele-
vant. The only relevant inquiry was whether an employer based it's deci-
sion either to discharge or to refuse to hire the plaintiff on a
discriminatory motive and, if so, whether a lawful reason also motivated
the employment decision. 3
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the 1991 Act") 4 amended Title VII.
As its preamble explains, the 1991 Act expands the remedies available to
persons injured by intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in
the workplace.8 It allows for recovery of both compensatory and puni-
tive damages, 6 and it provides jury trials to plaintiffs who seek such
damages.8 7 The 1991 Act dramatically transforms Title VII by essen-
tially creating a tort that allows for legal remedies.88
76. See id.
77. See id. The Court therefore remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the lawful reason alone would have caused the discharge. See id. at 287.
78. 490 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1989).
79. See id. at 242, 244-45, 258.
80. See id. at 244.
81. See id. at 240-41, 249.
82. See id. at 252.
83. See id. at 258.
84. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
85. See id. § 3(1).
86. See id. § 102 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1991)). These damages are
only available upon proof of "intentional" discrimination. See id.
87. See id.
88. See David A. Cathcart et al., The Civil Rights Act of 1991, at 9 (1993).
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The 1991 Act also responded to certain Supreme Court decisions 9 by
expanding particular civil rights statutes to provide greater protection to
employees injured by discrimination.9' Through the 1991 Act, Congress
modified Price Waterhouse by changing the outcome of mixed motive
cases involving Title VII.9 ' An employer now is always liable for dis-
crimination against an employee on the basis of the employee's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, even though additional lawful fac-
tors also motivated the employer's employment decision. 92 The presence
of an unlawful motive by itself entitles a plaintiff to some affirmative re-
lief.93 The 1991 Act, however, expressly limits the types of relief avail-
able to mixed motive plaintiffs. Thus, if the plaintiff proves an
impermissible classification was a motivating factor and the employer
demonstrates that it would have reached the same employment decision
in the absence of that factor, courts may then grant declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and attorney's fees, but may not award damages or back
pay, or order reinstatement, promotion, or hiring.94
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF "AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE"
An employer uncovers "after-acquired evidence" of a complaining em-
ployee's misconduct during the discovery phase of an employment-dis-
crimination suit, often long after making the decision either to discharge
or to refuse to hire the employee.95 While this misconduct96 might have
89. See § 3(4), 105 Stat. at 1071. The legislation addressed Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Mar-
tin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989), and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See Lex K. Larson,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, at 6 (1992).
90. See iL § 3(4).
91. See David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 899, 924
n.132 (1993); Larson, supra note 89, at 6; Cathcart et al., supra note 88, at 30; Merrick T.
Rossein, Employment Discrimination: Law and Litigation § 2.13, at 2-86 (1993).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. III 1991); Cathcart, supra note 88, at 30-31.
93. See Cathcart, supra note 88, at 31.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1991); Cathcart, supra note 88, at 31;
Larson, supra note 89, at 31; Rossein, supra note 91, § 2.13(7)(e), at 2-118.
95. See Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 1993);
Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 1992); Washington v.
Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys.,
955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d
700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988); Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 1-2.
96. The two forms of employee misconduct are that which had occurred after the
employee had been hired ("post-hiring misconduct") and that which had occurred even
before the employee was hired ("pre-hiring misconduct"). Examples of post-hiring mis-
conduct include fraud, see Summers, 864 F.2d at 703, unauthorized removal of records,
see Mackey v. Board of Pensions of the United Methodist Church, No. 91 C 5739, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 424, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1993); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D. Ariz. 1992), and falsification of a group
insurance application and an insurance claim, see Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1225, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Examples of pre-
hiring misconduct include resume fraud or lying on a job application. See Kristufek, 985
F.2d at 369; Washington, 969 F.2d at 251-52; Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414; Churchman v.
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served as a lawful reason for the employment decision,97 it cannot serve
as an actual "cause" because it was unknown at the time the decision was
made.98 Thus, the term "after-acquired evidence" is a misnomer-the
defendant actually "after-acquires" an affirmative defense.99
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a defendant to set forth
any affirmative defenses in her answer to the plaintiff's complaint."J~ But
employers do not uncover employee misconduct until the discovery
phase, so they fail to include this defense in their initial answer. This
failure, however, rarely acts as a waiver because the federal rules allow
for liberal amendment of pleadings, provided the opposing party is not
unduly prejudiced.101 Therefore, defendants encounter little difficulty in
amending their answer and moving for summary judgment once they un-
cover evidence of employee misconduct.102
The federal courts have developed two different approaches in re-
sponse to the affirmative defense of "after-acquired evidence."10 3 A ma-
jority of courts"° hold that the employee was not legally injured despite
Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D. Kan. 1991); Punahele v. United Air Lines,
756 F. Supp. 487, 489 (D. Colo. 1991).
97. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1176-77; Washington, 969 F.2d at 253; Johnson, 955
F.2d at 414; Summers, 864 F.2d at 708; O'Day, 784 F. Supp. at 1468; Grzenia v. Inter-
spec, Inc., No. 91 C 290, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15093, at *7-8 (N.D. I11. Oct. 21, 1991);
Churchman, 756 F. Supp. at 519; Punahele, 756 F. Supp. at 490; Rubinstein, supra note
10, at 20.
98. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
99. Affirmative defenses stem from the common law plea of "confession and avoid-
ance." See Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1270, at 411 (2d ed. 1990). This common law plea resulted in the defendant's admis-
sion that plaintiff successfully demonstrated a prima facie case but that "additional new
material ... would defeat plaintiff's otherwise valid cause of action." Id.
100. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
101. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) & (b); Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 532 F. Supp.
734, 736 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Wright & Miller, supra note 99, § 1278, at 494-502.
102. Allegations of employee fraud must be stated with particularity as well. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b).
103. See Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993); Kravit v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 994, 996 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Some
state courts have also addressed this issue. See, e.g., Schuessler v. Benchmark Mktg. &
Consulting, Inc., 500 N.W.2d 529, 540 (Neb. 1993) (holding that if post-termination evi-
dence justified termination, the employee may not recover any damages for the period
following the actual discharge); Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 575 N.E.2d
1107, 1113-14 (Mass. 1991) (denying an employer's summary judgment motion based on
an employee's pre-hiring misconduct in a wrongful discharge action because of the pres-
ence of disputed issues of material fact); see also Lohmann v. Towers, Perrin, Forster, &
Crosby, Inc., No. H-91-3586, 1992 WL 473856, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 1992) (finding
that Texas law would apply the minority approach in cases involving the affirmative de-
fense of "after-acquired evidence"). But see Mosley v. Truckstops Corp., No. 77916,
1993 WL 191378, at *3 (Okla. June 2, 1993) ("We have never applied the Summers
rationale to a retaliatory discharge action ...."); Muth, supra note 9, at 336 n.31 ("No
state court to date has strictly enforced the Summers doctrine on a state civil rights act
claim.").
104. This majority is comprised of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits and their district
courts. See Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1992); Summers
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the employer's actual discrimination and, therefore, they dismiss the em-
ployee's suit. 10 5 A minority of courts, however, find that the employee
was legally injured and therefore entitled to some remedy. "o6 The minor-
ity courts have, however, developed two views regarding the award of
back pay. Some limit accrual of back pay to the time the misconduct was
uncovered during the course of the litigation. 107 Others require the em-
ployer to show whether, had the employee never brought suit, the mis-
conduct would have been uncovered before the date of the court's
judgment.108
A. The Employer's View: The Majority Approach
Employee misconduct arises in three types of suits: (1) wrongful dis-
charge suits involving post-hiring misconduct,"° (2) wrongful discharge
suits involving pre-hiring misconduct, and (3) wrongful refusal to hire
suits involving pre-hiring misconduct. 10 Employers in post-hiring mis-
conduct suits argue that, had they learned of an employee's post-hiring
misconduct while she was still employed, they would have lawfully fired
that employee."' Courts call this the "would have fired" defense."'
Employers in wrongful discharge suits involving pre-hiring misconduct
argue that had they known of the misconduct, they either "would not
have hired" or "would have fired" the employee." 3 Employers in
wrongful refusal to hire suits only raise the "would not have hired"
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988). District courts in
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have used the mixed-motive approach as well. See Redd v.
Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547, 551 (W.D. Tex. 1992); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992). But see Benitez v. Portland Gen.
Elec., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1130, 1136 (D. Or. 1992) ("In view of the absence
of Ninth Circuit precedent, and the harshness of the result [of applying Summers to this
case], [the court] decline[s] to dismiss the discrimination claims on the basis of defend-
ant's after-acquired evidence.").
105. For a discussion of the majority approach, see infra notes 109-36 and accompany-
ing text.
106. See Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369-70 (7th Cir.
1993); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178-79 (1 1th Cir. 1992). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") supports this minority view. See infra
notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
107. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
108. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
109. Post-hiring misconduct may be raised only in wrongful discharge actions, because
the employer obviously cannot argue that it failed to hire an employee due to misconduct
that occurred after employment had already begun.
110. Compare Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (D. Colo.
1992) (wrongful discharge suit) with Punahele v. United Air Lines, 756 F. Supp. 487, 488
(D. Colo. 1991) (wrongful refusal to hire suit).
111. See, eg., Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 702-03 (em-
ployee would have been fired for fraud that occurred while plaintiff was employed);
O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1467 (employee would
have been fired for unauthorized removal of files).
112. See Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 254 n.3 (7th Cir. 1992); Baab
v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246, 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
113. See Washington, 969 F.2d at 254 n.3; Baab, 811 F. Supp. at 1257.
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defense. "4
Courts following the majority approach grant an employer's motion
for summary judgment and dismiss the employee's cause of action in all
three types of suits. 115 These courts assert that the employee is not enti-
tled to any relief or remedy, even if discrimination in fact occurred, be-
cause the employee simply did not suffer a Title VII injury.1 16 Thus,
liability ceases to be relevant, 1 7 and these courts bar recovery because
the employee suffered no legally recognizable injury." 8
1. Post-Hiring Misconduct
The Tenth Circuit first articulated the affirmative defense of "after-
acquired evidence" in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. 119 Four years after the employee's discharge, the employer,
while preparing for trial, discovered that the employee had falsified com-
pany records over one hundred fifty times during his employment.' 20
The Summers court analogized this situation to a traditional mixed mo-
tive case12 ' and held that the employee did not suffer a Title VII injury,
114. See Washington, 969 F.2d at 253; Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409,
414 (6th Cir. 1992); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D. Kan.
1991); Punahele v. United Air Lines, 756 F. Supp. 487, 489 (D. Colo. 1991).
115. See Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304-05 (6th
Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993); Wash-
ington, 969 F.2d at 251-52; Bonger, 789 F. Supp. at 1107; O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (D. Az. 1992); Churchman, 756 F. Supp. at 519;
Grzenia v. Interspec, Inc., No. 91 C 290, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15093, at *6-8 (N.D. I11.
Oct. 18, 1991).
116. See Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 305; Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988).
117. See e.g., Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 305 ("[S]ince the trial court found as a fact
that falsification of the employment application . . . would have resulted in [the em-
ployee's] termination, it becomes irrelevant whether or not [the employee] was discrimi-
nated against .... "). Indeed, the standard for a motion of summary judgment requires
the court to assume that discrimination did in fact occur. See e.g., Summers v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988) ("As concerns [the em-
ployer's] motion[ for summary judgment, it is assumed that [the employer] was moti-
vated, at least in part, if not substantially, because of [the employee's] age and religion.").
118. Therefore, dismissal results not because the employer is not liable, but because the
employee was not legally injured. One cannot "sustain a cause of action ... [unless] he
has sustained some injury to his legal personal or property rights.... ." IA C.J.S. Actions
§ 32(a) (1985). See also Adams v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 736 F.2d 992, 994 (4th Cir.
1984) ("[T]he existence of a wrong without some identifiable injury does not provide a
basis for redress."). Therefore, one may sustain actual damage without the occurrence of
an act or omission deemed by the law to be an injury. In such cases, no cause of action
arises. See IA C.J.S. Actions § 32(b) 394 (1985). Two possible though unstated reasons
may also be the old common law and equity's "Clean Hands" maxim. See infra notes
184-99 and accompanying text.
119. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
120. See id. Before discovering the evidence of post-hiring misconduct, the employer
claimed that the employee had been discharged due to his poor attitude and inability to
get along with coworkers and customers. See id. at 702-03. Once it discovered the after-
acquired evidence, the employer raised the "would have fired" defense. See id.
121. The Tenth Circuit relied strongly on Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Summers was decided in 1988, one year before the
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even though discrimination might have occurred, because the employer
would have lawfully fired the employee had it known of the post-hiring
misconduct.122 Using this mixed motive analysis, the court reasoned that
the employer had a lawful basis for the discharge, thereby rendering the
employee ineligible for any Title VII relief.'23 Accordingly, the court
granted the defendant's summary judgment motion and dismissed the
suit. 
12 4
Some subsequent cases refined the use of this mixed motive approach
in wrongful discharge suits involving post-hiring misconduct.'" They
created a materiality requirement, holding that an employer must show
that it would have, rather than could have, discharged the employee had
it known of the misconduct either before or at the time of termination. ,26
Should the employer fail to prove materiality, a genuine issue of material
fact remains and these courts will not dismiss the suit.2 7
2. Pre-Hiring Misconduct
Subsequent cases extended the mixed motive approach to both wrong-
ful discharge suits128 and wrongful refusal to hire suits' 29 involving pre-
hiring misconduct. Pre-hiring misconduct usually takes the form of mis-
representations in resumes,130 job applications,' 3' or pre-employment in-
Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989), which considered the mixed-motive approach within the context of Title VII. See
supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
122. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
123. See id The lawful excuse alone would have been proper, thereby making the
possibility that discrimination may have occurred irrelevant. See Milligan-Jensen v.
Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 305 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993).
124. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 708. The court equated the employer's defense with
that of a hypothetical company that fired its doctor "because of his age, race, religion,
and sex," but successfully defended a civil rights action by discovering, after the institu-
tion of the suit, "that the discharged employee was not a 'doctor.'" Id.
125. See Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 303-05; Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp.
547, 551-53 (W.D. Tex. 1992); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F.
Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Ariz. 1992).
126. See Malone v. Signal Processing Technologies, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 370, 374-75 (D.
Colo. 1993); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-06 (D. Colo.
1992); O'Day, 784 F. Supp. at 1468-69.
127. See Malone, 826 F. Supp. at 375; Bonger, 789 F. Supp. at 1107; O'Day, 784 F.
Supp. at 1468-69; O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656, 658 (D. Utah 1990).
128. See Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992); Church-
man v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D. Kan. 1991).
129. See Punahele v. United Air Lines, 756 F. Supp. 487, 489 (D. Colo. 1991).
130. See Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1992); Smith
v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir. 1989).
131. See Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414; Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 977 F.2d 976,
978 (6th Cir. 1992); Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 303
(6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993);
Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 1992); Baab v. AMR
Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246, 1255-57 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Churchman, 756 F. Supp. at
516; Punahele, 756 F. Supp. at 489.
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terviews. 132 A court will dismiss an employee's cause of action for
wrongful discharge if the employer shows either that the employee would
not have been hired or that she would have been discharged as soon as
the employer had learned of this misconduct. 3 3 Similarly, a court will
reject an applicant's claim of a wrongful refusal to hire if the employer
shows that it would not have hired the applicant. 34
3. The 1991 Act and the Majority Approach
Courts have avoided deciding whether the 1991 Act affects the major-
ity approach. Only two courts have recognized that the 1991 Act might
apply, but they declined to address the issue because none of the parties
raised the question of the 1991 Act's applicability. 35 They observed in
dicta, however, that the use of the mixed motive approach in cases in-
volving employee misconduct was probably inconsistent with the
changes implemented by the 1991 Act. 136
B. The Employee's View: A Post Facto Pretext Approach
Even courts employing the majority approach sometimes acknowledge
that the employer's affirmative defense "may serve as a post facto pre-
text"'137 for its action. The Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the mixed
motive approach in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.,' 38 a wrongful dis-
charge suit involving pre-hiring misconduct. 39 Crafting a "post facto
132. See Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993).
133. See Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 305; Washington, 969 F.2d at 256-57; Johnson,
955 F.2d at 413; Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-06 (D.
Colo. 1992); DeVoe v. Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 546, 552 (D. Kan. 1992); Grzenia v.
Interspec, Inc., No. 91 C 290, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15093, at *7-8 (N.D. I11. Oct. 18,
1991); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 994-95 (D. Kan. 1989).
134. See Punahele, 756 F. Supp. at 490-91.
135. See Washington, 969 F.2d at 255 n.4; Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d
1174, 1184 n. 17 (1Ith Cir. 1992). See also Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828
F. Supp. 314, 323 (D.N.J. 1993) (noting the 1991 Act only for its persuasive support for
the district court's holding).
136. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1184 n.17; Washington, 969 F.2d at 255 n.4. The Wash-
ington court expressly assumed that the majority approach survived the changes imple-
mented by the 1991 Act. See Washington, 969 F.2d at 256 n.6. It refused to address this
issue, however, perhaps because it had earlier held that the 1991 Act only applied pro-
spectively. See Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 932
(7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992); see also Boyd v. Rubbermaid Com-
mercial Prods., Inc., Civil Action No. 91-0083-H, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20455, at * 14-
15 & n.2 (W.D. Va. Dec. 11, 1992) (refusing to "bootstrap a waning area of Title VII case
law [the majority view of the after-acquired evidence doctrine]" in a suit involving both
pre- and post-hiring misconduct and violations of the Equal Pay Act due to the effect of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on the majority approach), dismissed, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7141 (W.D. Va. May 25, 1993). For a discussion of the effects of the 1991 Act,
see supra text accompanying notes 84-94.
137. DeVoe v. Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 546, 552-53 (D. Kan. 1992).
138. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
139. The plaintiff in Wallace alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed her before
she was fired. See id. at 1176. She subsequently admitted in a deposition that she had
lied on her job application when she checked "No" in response to a question concerning
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pretext" approach, the court held that the employer bore the burden of
persuasion for showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether and
in what manner the employee misconduct would have lawfully altered
the employment relationship." 4 The court then determined which reme-
dies should be granted in light of the employee misconduct. 4 '
This minority view 42 distinguishes wrongful discharge suits involving
pre-hiring misconduct from wrongful refusal to hire suits involving pre-
hiring misconduct.' 43 An applicant's claim of wrongful refusal to hire
will be dismissed if the prospective employer would still have refused to
hire the prospective employee even absent any unlawful motives.' The
employer must, however, prove that it would have uncovered a lawful
reason in the next step of the hiring process. 45 The plaintiff does not
suffer any Title VII injuries in this type of case because she would not
have been hired even in the absence of a discriminatory motive. 4 6 Alter-
natively, a Title VII injury occurs in a wrongful discharge case because
the employee, absent a discriminatory motive, would have remained em-
ployed for a longer period of time, at least until the employer lawfully
discovered the misconduct. 147
Since an employee suffers a legal injury, evidence of misconduct re-
mains relevant only to the determination of what relief to award a pre-
vailing Title VII plaintiff. 4 Because the boundary between the
employer's prerogatives and the relief afforded a victim of discrimination
varies in accordance with the facts of each action, this approach evalu-
ates the effect of employee misconduct on Title VII's remedies on a case-
prior criminal convictions-she had previously pled guilty in another state to possession
of illegal drugs. See id. at 1176-77. The employer raised the "would not have hired" and
"would have fired" defenses. See id. at 1177. For a discussion on these two defenses, see
supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
140. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181 n.ll. See also Johnson, supra note 9, at 77 ("This
holding should come as no surprise. The 11th Circuit has rejected several previous at-
tempts to rationalize adverse employment decisions with information unknown to the
decision-maker at the time the decision was made.").
141. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1183-84.
142. In addition to the Seventh Circuit, see infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text,
two other cases have applied this approach. See Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 91
CIV. 6629 (MEL), 1993 WL 370582, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993); Massey v. Trump's
Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 323-24 (D.N.J. 1993); see also Boyd v. Rub-
bermaid Comm'1 Prods., Inc., Civil Action No. 91-0083-H, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20455, at * 15 (W.D. Va. Dec. 11, 1992) (applying the minority approach in an Equal
Pay Act case), dismissed, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7141 (W.D. Va. May 25, 1993).




147. See id.; Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 323-24
(D.N.J. 1993); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (D. Colo.
1992); Grafv. Wire Rope Corp., No. WD 45952, 1993 WL 381560, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 1993).
148. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181; Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 91 CIV.
6629 (MEL), 1993 WL 370582, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993); Massey, 828 F. Supp. at
323-24.
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by-case basis. 149 For example, the Wallace court decided that declara-
tory relief, back pay, and attorney's fees were available to the plaintiff,
but precluded reinstatement or an injunction as a matter of law.150 It
also held that back pay was "available from the time of discharge to the
time of judgment unless the employer c[ould] prove that discovery of the
misconduct . . . would have occurred at an earlier date absent the
discrimination." 15 1
C. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit also rejects the idea that employee misconduct
may be a complete defense and refuses to preclude an employee's cause
of action because "[a] discriminatory firing must be decided solely with
respect to the known circumstances leading to the discharge.' ' 5 2 Thus,
the court confines its consideration of the lawfulness of a termination to
the reasons the employer gives at the time of discharge. 5 1
But the Seventh Circuit charts a different course concerning back pay
awards-it limits accrual of back pay to the time the misconduct is actu-
ally uncovered rather than to the time of judgment. 54  Wallace places
149. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181.
150. See id. at 1181.
151. Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 322.
152. Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1993). The
court noted that "[tihe deterring statutory penalty is for retaliatory firing, the character
of which is not changed by some after discovered alternate reason for discharge which
might otherwise have been used, but was not. The after discovered alternate reason
comes too late." Id.; see also Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("Whether [defendant] discriminated against [plaintiff] must be decided solely
with respect to the reason given for [plaintiff's] discharge .... [Plaintiff's] resume fraud
is, for this purpose, irrelevant.").
In one case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment
to defendant. The circuit court held that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief, even if
plaintiff had been fired for a discriminatory reason, because plaintiff had lied on his em-
ployment application. See Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 251 (7th Cir.
1992). This case did not, however, adopt the majority rule. The sole issue raised by
plaintiff on appeal was whether a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding defend-
ant's claim that it either would not have hired or would have fired plaintiff had it known
of the misconduct. See id. "Although this Court has never squarely adopted the Sum-
mers rationale, [plaintiff] does not challenge its validity." Id. at 253. The plaintiff, there-
fore, erred in not challenging the underlying basis of the summary judgment. See Massey,
828 F. Supp. at 320-21.
153. See Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 369. In fact the Washington court explicitly rejected
the "would not have hired" argument for two reasons. First, it "unjustified[ly] im-
port[ed]... 'property right' concepts into employment discrimination law." Washington,
969 F.2d at 256. Title VII does not require this concept, nor is it a defense to a federal
discrimination complaint. See id. Second, under Mt. Healthy and Price Waterhouse, "the
temporal focus is on the time of the adverse employment decision, and the inquiry is
whether the same employment decision would have been made if the protected character-
istic or conduct were removed from consideration." Id. The court concluded that this
same standard applied to employers raising the affirmative defense of after-acquired evi-
dence. See id. See generally King, supra note 9 (summarizing Washington)
154. The National Labor Relations Board agrees with this restriction of recovery. See
Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 321 n.8.
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the burden on the employer to prove when, absent the litigation, it would
have uncovered the employee's misconduct. 55 In contrast, the Seventh
Circuit allows recovery of back pay only until the time the employer
actually discovers the misconduct. 56 This limitation occurs subject to a
materiality requirement: the employer must demonstrate that the plain-
tiff's conduct was both wrongful and that this conduct would, not could,
have resulted in termination. 57
D. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") agrees
with the minority view and acknowledges that employee misconduct is
"relevant only to the issue of appropriate remedy."' 15' The EEOC articu-
lated this position in both a 1992 decision' 5 9 and a 1993 memoran-
dum."6 The EEOC agrees with the Seventh Circuit that back pay
awards may be limited to the period between an employee's unlawful
termination and the date the employer acquires a non-discriminatory
reason for the termination.' 6' It also acknowledged that the employee's
misconduct may prevent reinstatement or the payment of a portion of
compensatory damages covering losses arising after the date when this
misconduct would have been discovered. 62 At least one court, however,
refused to grant any deference to the EEOC's position because it only
articulates a litigation position and is not an actual guideline. 63 This
155. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1184 (11th Cir. 1992). Essen-
tially, this results in a back pay award that accrues up until the date of judgment. See
Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 323-24; see also Johnson, supra note 9, at 77 ("Of course, in the
case of post-hiring employee misconduct, it will be extremely difficult to prove that such
evidence would have been discovered absent the termination, because it is the termination
itself (and resulting litigation) which normally brings such matters to light.")
156. See Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 371.
157. See id at 369; Reed v. AMAX Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992);
Connell, supra note 9, at 288-89.
158. Revised EEOC Memorandum, supra note 17. See also Follette, supra note 6, at
663 ("The EEOC... support[s] the minority view."); Robert J. Gregory, The Use of
After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Caser Should the Guilty Em-
ployer Go Free?, 9 Lab. Law. 43 (1993) (the author, an attorney with the EEOC, criticizes
the majority view).
159. See EEOC 1992 Decision, supra note 48, at *8.
160. See Revised EEOC Memorandum, supra note 17.
161. See id; EEOC 1992 Decision, supra note 48, at *8; see also Johnson, supra note 9,
at 78 n.10 ("The 11 th Circuit's creation of an additional evidentiary burden for employ-
ers to overcome in order to halt the backpay period goes beyond even the EEOC's posi-
tion."); Jonathan Groner & Stephen G. Hirsch, Old News is Bad News, The Recorder,
Mar. 3, 1993, at 1 ("'Once you can show that the employee would have been fired,
there's no liability beyond the date when you have that evidence,' says [Donald] Living-
ston, general counsel of the EEOC]."). But see Russell v. Microdyne Corp., No. CIV.A.
93-136-A, 1993 WL 343558, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 7, 1993) (arguing, despite the EEOC's
recommendation, that "no distinction exists between liability and remedy when no relief
is available because of after-acquired evidence of deception during hiring").
162. See EEOC 1992 Decision, supra note 48, at *8.
163. See Russell, 1993 WL 343558, at *3. The court also pointed out that even "guide-
lines themselves lack the force of administrative rules." Id.
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reasoning served as the basis for that court's decision to ignore the
EEOC's recommendation. 1"
III. THE PROPER ROLE OF EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
The majority approach to wrongful discharge suits involving the af-
firmative defense of "after-acquired evidence" is fundamentally flawed
because it allows an employer to benefit from information that it discov-
ered only as a result of its discrimination. Although the majority ap-
proach is justifiably concerned with employee misconduct, it fails to
deter discrimination in the workplace, to punish an employer who has
discriminated, or to compensate an employee for injuries resulting from
discrimination. Moreover, wrongful discharge suits involving post-ter-
mination discovery of employee misconduct have never been analogous
to traditional mixed motive cases. Finally, it is inconsistent to bar any
relief for plaintiffs in "after-acquired evidence" suits when Title VII now
expressly provides relief for plaintiffs even though lawful reasons, in part,
motivated the employer.
Only the minority approach furthers Title VII's goals. It is also more
likely to induce settlements and prevent these suits from ever reaching
the courts in the first place. Finally, requiring an employer to prove that
it would have discovered the misconduct at a certain point in time absent
its discrimination gives a court the greatest flexibility to make employees
whole165 by "fashion[ing] the most complete relief possible.166
A. The Inadequacies of the Majority Approach
in Wrongful Discharge Suits
Under the majority approach, an employer unfairly benefits from its
wrongdoing, because discrimination precipitates discovery of the em-
ployee's misconduct. Therefore, courts should require employers to
demonstrate when they would have discharged the employee absent the
discriminatory motive167 because only the motives present at the time the
employer decided to fire the employee are relevant to the issue of
liability.
1. The Inapplicability of Traditional Mixed Motive Cases
Whether the employer would have fired the employee is relevant to the
issue of damages,16 but it remains irrelevant to the issue of liability be-
164. See id.
165. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975).
166. 118 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams).
167. The materiality requirement, even if strictly enforced, only requires that an em-
ployer demonstrate that it would have fired the employee, but not when it would have.
168. The "would not have hired" defense is never relevant because the employee was
in fact hired. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the "would not have
hired" defense, see supra note 153.
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cause the employee's misconduct did not act as a cause of the dis-
charge. 169 Therefore, the majority approach's reliance on Mount Healthy
City School District Board of Education v. Doyle 70 and Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins'7 is misplaced because these suits concerned the liability of
employers who based their decisions on two or more factors instead of a
single "true" motive.'72 Even before the 1991 Act, a prevailing employer
in a mixed motive case had to assert a lawful reason for its employment
decision that, standing alone, would have induced the very same deci-
sion.' 73 An employer could not proffer a reason that did not motivate it
at the moment it made the decision. 71
But when employers raise the affirmative defense of "after-acquired
evidence," courts must assume liability even if only for purposes of sum-
mary judgment.' 75 Evidence of employee misconduct cannot serve as a
reason for the employer's decision because the employer learned of it
only after commencement of the discrimination suit.' 76 Thus, the fact
that the employer could have relied on this misconduct in order to dis-
charge the employee is irrelevant-Title VII is concerned only with mo-
tives present when the actual discharge decision was made. 177 It is
169. See note 98 and accompanying text.
170. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
171. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
172. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring in judgment). See
also O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Ariz.
1992) (noting that Price Waterhouse only dealt with liability while the majority approach
deals with whether the employee was injured); Revised EEOC Memorandum, supra note
17 ("After-acquired evidence cases are not mixed-motive cases and should not be ana-
lyzed under the standards that apply to mixed-motive cases. Those standards are limited
to cases where multiple factors are considered by an employer at the time that it made an
employment decision."); Samuel Estreicher, The Doctrine of After-Acquired Evidence,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 29, 1993, at 4 ("Properly understood, the after-acquired evidence doctrine
has nothing to do with the 'dual motive' problem.").
173. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252; Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d
250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
174. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241, 252; EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901
F.2d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 91 CIV.
6629 (MEL), 1993 WL 370582, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993) ("Price Waterhouse is
not controlling here because it involved a case of 'mixed motives.' . . . Here, the non-
discriminating reason for dismissal put forth by the [employer] ... was never a factor in
the [employer]'s actual decision to terminate [the employee]."); Mosley v. Truckstops
Corp., No. 77,916, 1993 WL 191378, at *7 n.14 (Okla. June 2, 1993) ("Post-termination
discovery of employee misconduct has traditionally been no defense in employee's claim
of discrimination.").
175. See eg., Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th
Cir. 1988) ("As concerns... [defendant]'s motion] for summary judgment, it is assumed
that [defendant] was motivated, at least in part, if not substantially, because of [plain-
tiff's] age and religion.").
176. See id.
177. See e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.
1993) ("A discriminatory firing must be decided solely with respect to the known circum-
stances leading to the discharge... [The character of [a retaliatory discharge] is not
changed by some after discovered alternate reason... which might otherwise have been
used, but was not. The after discovered alternate reason comes too late.") (citations
omitted); cf Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When af]
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inconsistent to hold that employees were neither legally injured nor enti-
tled to any remedy because of misconduct that their employers never
considered when Title VII now explicitly entitles employees to relief even
when their employers were motivated in part by lawful reasons.18
In addition, the majority approach improperly places an employee in a
worse position than she would have been in had she not been a member
of a protected class. Absent her race, religion, color, gender, or national
origin, she would have remained employed for an indeterminate period
of time beyond the date of her actual discharge.17 9 Some employers may
not discharge an employee after discovering pre-hiring misrepresenta-
tions, even if the same employers would not have hired the employee had
they initially known of the misrepresentations. 80 This employee would
indeed suffer a Title VII injury from the discriminatory discharge."8 '
This result has compelled some courts employing the majority approach
... plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an illegitimate criterion
was a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision, the deterrent purpose of the
statute has clearly been triggered."); Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 115 (D.C. Cir.
1980) ("What 'could have been' is never alone a sufficient foundation for a finding of
what really 'was'...."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981); Gudel, supra note 5, at 97
n.311 ("If nothing else, [the mixed motive approach] decisions violate the moral principle
that two wrongs don't make a right. If Title VII is meant to eradicate discrimination in
employment, then the acts of the employers in these cases must be illegal, although the
employers might have an argument against reinstatement as a remedy.").
178. Cf Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 323 (D.N.J.
1993) ("We note the [1991 Act] only for its persuasive support for our conclusion that an
injury does occur when an employment decision is based upon improper motives notwith-
standing that other legitimate rationale surfaced after the fact.").
179. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178-80 (11th Cir. 1992); see
also Puhy v. Delta Air Lines, No. 1:91-CV-1630-RCF, 1993 WL 405426, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 30, 1993) ("In wrongful discharge cases, if the discrimination had not occurred,
then the plaintiff would have still possessed the job. Allowing subsequent evidence to
negate the otherwise cognizable injury would establish that the status quo ante was job-
lessness, not employment, thus placing the plaintiff in a worse position .... ). The
mixed-motive approach erroneously excuses "all liability based on what hypothetically
would have occurred absent the alleged discriminatory motive assuming the employer had
knowledge that it would not acquire until sometime during the litigation .... " Wallace,
968 F.2d at 1179.
180. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1178-80; Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250,
254 (7th Cir. 1992); Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 323; Bonger v. American Water Works, 789
F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (D. Colo. 1992).
181. Injury occurs because the employee would have had a longer tenure absent the
discriminatory motive. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178-79 & n.8
(11 th Cir. 1992); see also Graf v. Wire Rope Corp., No. WD 45952, 1993 WL 381560, at
* 1 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1993) ("An employer might waive a well-performing em-
ployee's false employment application answers."); Morley Witus, Defense of Wrongful
Discharge Suits Based on an Employee's Misrepresentations, 69 Mich. B.J. 50, 50 (1990)
("While in a given case the factfinder may conclude that an employee's lies did warrant
dismissal, the contrary conclusion is possible. Given an employee's exemplary perform-
ance, for example, a jury, judge, or arbitrator might find that there was no just cause for
termination."); cf Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) ("[W]e
think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title
VII .... Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that
each employee be free from discriminatory practices.").
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to observe that dismissal of the employee's cause of action may be too
harsh."8 2 Thus, evidence of misconduct discovered after commencement
of a suit remains relevant only to the issue of which remedies are avail-
able, because this evidence does not change the fact that discrimination
may actually have occurred.18 3
2. The Common Law and the Clean Hands Maxim
Under common law, employers relied on evidence of an employee's
misconduct whether or not they knew of it at the time of the dis-
charge.18 This made sense because an employer could terminate an em-
ployee for any cause or no cause whatsoever. 8 5 Title VII changes this,
however, because it prohibits discharge based on certain specific rea-
sons. 186 Therefore, courts cannot rely on the old common law rule. The
proper focus in a Title VII suit is on what prompted the employment
decision at the time it was made; subsequent reasons are irrelevant.18 7
Another possible reason'88 for the majority approach's appeal is the
equitable maxim"8 9 that plaintiffs "who come[] into equity must come
with clean hands."' 19 0 This allowed a court of equity to deny relief to a
plaintiff even where her complaint was actionable because of her own
misconduct. 9 ' Fraud or misrepresentation by the plaintiff caused courts
to invoke the maxim' 9 2 and they denied relief "where it appear[ed] that
the right upon which the complainant relie[d] ... [grew] out of a wrong
"193
The maxim's application in suits involving the "after-acquired evi-
dence" defense, however, thwarts Title VII's purposes. 94 Prior to the
182. See Bonger, 789 F. Supp. at 1107; Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F.
Supp. 991, 995 (D. Kan. 1989); cf Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246, 1260
n.5 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (criticizing aspects of the mixed-motive analysis).
183. See Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1993);
Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1225, 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
184. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 81-83 and accompanying text.
188. No court has advanced this argument yet. At least two commentators, however,
have raised and rejected it. See Estreicher, supra note 172, at 4; Follette, supra note 6, at
665-66.
189. Equity courts created several rules or "maxims" that governed the applicability
and scope of equity jurisdiction. See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 119 (1966). Among other
things, these maxims addressed actions of the court, a party's standing to seek relief, and
the mode for "balancing" equities of equal dignity. See id.
190. Manufacturers' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 451 (1935).
191. See National Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 336-38 (1930).
192. See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 138 (1966).
193. Id.
194. See, eg., 30A C.J.S. Equity § 111 (1992) ("The maxim cannot be applied in any
case where the result of the application sustains a relation which is denounced by statute
. i"); d § 112 ("[Ihe maxim cannot be applied in any case where the result of the
application sustains a relation which is contrary to public policy."); Follette, supra note 6,
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enactment of the 1991 Act, Title VII provided only equitable reme-
dies,' 95 and therefore some courts might have implicitly relied on this
principle. 9 6 But the addition of legal remedies to the statute 97 makes
the maxim inapplicable because it cannot deny legal rights, even if part of
the available relief lies in equity.198 Furthermore, welfare legislation,
such as Title VII, "is entitled to a liberal construction to accomplish its
beneficent purposes." 199
B. The Advantages of the Minority Approach
The minority's two-step' °° approach more fully satisfies Title VII's
two goals of eliminating discrimination in the workplace and giving resti-
tution to an injured employee. The first step inquires whether the em-
ployer violated Title VII.2 °' Thus, a minority court refuses to dismiss an
employee's cause of action for wrongful discharge despite the discovery
of either post-hiring or pre-hiring misconduct. If the court finds discrim-
ination, it proceeds to the second step by determining the proper relief.202
A court may grant remedies that will sufficiently punish the employer
and restore the employee to the position that she would have been in
absent the discrimination.2 03 Yet this approach remains flexible because
a court may refuse to grant certain remedies in light of the employee's
misconduct in order to avoid placing the employee in a better21' position
at 665-66 (arguing that the maxim is inapplicable because the misconduct and the dis-
crimination are not causally related and because Title VII's public policy considerations
override it). Courts have also traditionally recognized the more important maxim that
"equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy." See Independent Wireless Tel.
Co. v. Radio Corp., 269 U.S. 459, 468 (1926); see also Farmers' Educ. & Coop. Union v.
Farmers' Educ. & Coop. Union, Iowa Div., 141 F. Supp. 820, 824 (D. Iowa 1956) (noting
that the clean hands maxim is only applied reluctantly), aff'd 247 F.2d 809 (8th Cir.
1957).
195. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
196. See Estreicher, supra note 172, at 4. Indeed, the majority approach reasons that,
assuming discrimination occurred, plaintiff was not injured. See note 122-23 and accom-
panying text.
197. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
198. See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 111, at 324 & n.14 (1992); Estreicher, supra note 172, at
4.
199. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949).
200. See Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 91 CIV. 6629 (MEL), 1993 WL
370582, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993).
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. Although the 1991 Act prohibits back pay awards for plaintiffs in mixed motive
suits, see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text, this prohibition does not affect courts
employing the minority approach. These courts eschew the mixed-motive analysis, see
supra text accompanying notes 138-41, so they may still award back pay. See Wallace v.
Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1184 (11 th Cir. 1992); Estreicher, supra note 172, at 4.
204. For example, an award of back pay that accrues up until the date of judgment
places the employee in as good a position as she would have been in had the discrimina-
tion not occurred. Reinstatement, however, would go beyond an appropriate remedy and
would violate Title VII's protection of an employer's freedom of choice. See supra notes
44-47 and accompanying text; see also Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d
364, 369-70 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing same).
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than she would have been in had the discrimination not occurred.
1. Pre-Hiring Misconduct and the McDonnell Douglas Model
The first step of the minority approach requires the employee to prove
that the employer is liable for discrimination, even though the employee's
misconduct might limit the availability of certain remedies.2°5 Therefore,
an employee is likely to follow the pretextual analysis articulated in Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.2"6 While employers cannot proffer the
employee's misconduct as a lawful reason for the discharge because it
was unknown at the time of their employment decision, they often argue
that the discrimination prevents an employee from making out a prima
facie case because the misconduct renders the employee "unqualified."'" 7
Some courts have held that trustworthiness and honesty are material
qualifications for any job.2"8 Therefore, lying on a job application
prompts two arguments: (1) the employee does not in fact possess the
necessary qualification lied about; and (2) the act of lying itself automati-
cally renders the employee materially unqualified.20 9
These arguments do not preclude the establishment of a prima facie
case. First, courts must assume employers intentionally discriminated
when employers do no more than raise the defense of "after-acquired
evidence. ' 210 Second, the Supreme Court has always viewed the McDon-
nell Douglas model as flexible. 21  Third, such discrimination perpetuates
itself if the court does not address it.21 2 Finally, the court's discretionary
205. See Moodie, 1993 WL 370582, at *3.
206. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
207. See Witus, supra note 181, at 51-53. For a discussion of establishing a primafacie
case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas model, see supra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
208. See Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 985 (1981); Grier v. Casey, 643 F. Supp. 298, 309 (W.D.N.C. 1986); Village of Oak
Lawn v. Human Rights Comm'n, 478 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (IIl. App. Ct. 1985); cf Living-
ston v. Sorg Printing Co., 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1417, 1418 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
("[A]lthough [defendant] did not fire [plaintiff] because of the misreprentations on his
resume and employment application, [plaintiff]'s admission of those misrepresentations
further bars him from meeting his prima facie burden and from establishing that he is
entitled to damages on his claim."); Robinson v. United States Air Force, 635 F. Supp.
108, 111-12 (D.D.C. 1986) (stating that misrepresentations on a job application raised
serious questions concerning plaintiffs truthfulness and basic qualifications).
209. See Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246, 1260 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
210. See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir.
1988).
211. See supra text accompanying note 58; see also Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109,
119 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Bazelon, J., concurring) ("Njeither precedent nor reason explains
why an employee's qualifications must be a 'critical element' of a discriminatory dismissal
claim.... [Tihe Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green did not intend to define
the elements of every employment discrimination claim; that case involved refusal to
hire.") (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981).
212. Instead, a finding that the employee is "unqualified" under McDonnell Douglas
actually places the employer in a better position than it would have been in absent its
discriminatory motive. Ordinarily, and absent any discriminatory motive, the most an
employer could do upon learning of pre-hiring misconduct is discharge the employee.
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ability to pick and choose among remedies, depending upon the specific
facts of the case, negates any potential windfall that the employee might
receive due to her misrepresentations. 213 Therefore, arguments that an
employee in a wrongful discharge suit is "unqualified" under McDonnell
Douglas simply lacks merit.2 14
2. Concerns with the Materiality Requirement
If a court determines that an employer discriminated, the second step
of the minority approach contemplates how to grant relief properly.
21 5
To facilitate this, some minority courts adopted the majority approach's
materiality requirement 216 for pre-hiring misrepresentations. 21 7 This ma-
teriality requirement supposedly prevents employers from avoiding Title
VII liability by using minor or technical infractions that, absent a dis-
criminatory motive, would not have prompted the same employment de-
cision.2" 8 Unfortunately, employers may easily evade this requirement.
Job application forms need only include language that specifically states
that any falsification would serve as grounds for discharge.219 Therefore,
an objective requirement alone, such as language in an application that
any misrepresentation will result in termination, is insufficient. Courts
must subjectively determine whether the employer would have fired the
employee based on the degree of importance of the misrepresentation or
misconduct.
But when an employee is found to be "unqualified," the employer avoids all liability for
its discrimination. This finding also encourages employers to refrain from verifying infor-
mation given by job applicants.
213. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
214. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Corp., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178-79 n.8 (1 th Cir. 1992).
215. See Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 91 CIV. 6628 (MEL), 1993 WL
370582, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993).
216. See supra note 126-27, 157 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.
1993) (" 'May be' [fired] is not 'will be' and is not enough to avoid the proven charge of a
retaliatory firing.").
218. See Reed v. AMAX Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992).
219. See Witus, supra note 181, at 53. The Wallace court, for instance, was concerned
that the employers would abuse the mixed motive approach by rummaging through a
discharged employee's past employment record in order to find a legitimate reason for
discharge. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1180 (11 th Cir. 1992). Em-
ployers who possessed "a proclivity for unlawful motives" could therefore hire an em-
ployee despite the employer's knowledge of a legitimate reason for rejecting the
application. Id. at 1180-81. Evidence of such knowledge could later be destroyed and
the employee discriminatorily discharged. See id. Upon commencement of a discrimina-
tion suit, the employee could then be "sandbagged" by the employer's "discovery" of the
legitimate reason for the discharge. See id.
An employer may still "sandbag" an employee by discovering misconduct and subse-
quently using this discovery to justify a termination it would have made for otherwise
discriminatory reasons. But this is a classic mixed motive case. An employee would be
able to prove that at least one of the employer's reasons was unlawful, and Title VII now
provides some affirmative relief. See supra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
3. Back Pay Awards
The Seventh Circuit's limitation of back pay awards to the date when
the misconduct is actually discovered 22 strikes "a comfortable 'middle
ground'... between the somewhat harsh denial of all relief... and the
Wallace approach." '221 But that "middle ground" guarantees that an em-
ployer will unfairly benefit from its discrimination, because the discrimi-
nation precipitated the discovery in the first place. 2 Alternatively, the
Wallace approach ensures the necessary flexibility for the varied range of
factual scenarios. By requiring a case-by-case assessment, a court may
provide nominal damages for instances of egregious employee miscon-
duct and appropriate punishment and relief for egregious employer
discrimination.
Awarding back pay remains consistent with Title VII's purposes.'
As previously discussed,22 a court may award back pay where it believes
that the facts of the case warrant it. Because this decision is determined
at the end of the trial after evaluation of all of the evidence, the threat of
back pay awards encourages employers to conform their conduct to the
requirements of Title VII.225 These awards also serve as incentives for
injured persons to bring private causes of action under Title VII. 2 6 Yet
courts may always limit back pay awards when an individual case re-
quires it, because the Supreme Court has traditionally recognized that
certain relief may be modified or withheld so long as Title VII's purposes
are not undermined.227
In practical terms, the minority approach is more likely to fulfill Title
VII's goals without requiring a court's involvement. The risk of liability
and the availability of back pay awards encourage settlements,2 most
likely before the parties ever reach the trial stage.
220. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's view on back pay, see notes 154-57 and
accompanying text.
221. Connell, supra note 9, at 288.
222. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 77 ("[I]n the case of post-hiring employee
misconduct, it will be extremely difficult to prove that such evidence would have been
discovered absent the termination .... To that end, the I 1th Circuit may have created a
virtually insurmountable evidentiary hurdle for employers to overcome in halting the
backpay period.").
223. The fact that the 1991 Act fails to make back pay awards available to plaintiffs in
mixed motive cases, see supra note 93-94 and accompanying text, is irrelevant. Mixed
motive cases concern liability, and the 1991 Act does not refer to the affirmative defense
of after-acquired evidence.
224. See supra note 149-51 and accompanying text.
225. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
226. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
227. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 770-71, 779 (1976).
228. The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged Congress's-and its own-
preference for enforcing Title VII through settlements. See Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n
of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523-24 n.13 (1986); Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 n.14 (1981); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44; Delta Air Lines v.
August, 450 U.S. 346, 363 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring); Carson v. American Brands,




C. Wrongful Refusal to Hire Suits Involving Pre-Hiring Misconduct
As discussed earlier, 2 9 the minority approach precludes wrongful re-
fusal to hire suits where the employer shows that it would have uncov-
ered the pre-hiring misconduct, or the misrepresentation itself, during
the course of the hiring process. Unlike a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee, an applicant, even if wrongfully refused employment, will not be
able to demonstrate an injury under Title VII because she will be unable
to prove that she would have been hired even if the discriminatory mo-
tive did not exist.2 30 Title VII neither guarantees jobs to people simply
because they are minorities nor compels employers to hire unqualified
employees.231 Thus, the employer enjoys no windfall, despite its discrim-
ination, because the plaintiff's lack of remedy results from her lack of a
statutory injury.
CONCLUSION
Courts addressing the affirmative defense of after-acquired evidence
are understandably concerned about allowing an employee to benefit
from her post-hiring or pre-hiring misconduct. Yet these courts must be
mindful of Congress's purposes in enacting Title VII-the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace and the restoration of injured employees
to their pre-discrimination position. To facilitate these goals Congress
recently added legal remedies to the full array of equitable remedies
available.
Only the minority approach avoids giving either the employee or the
employer a windfall while satisfying Congress's objectives. It correctly
requires the employer to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
whether and in what manner the discovery of employee misconduct
would have lawfully altered the employment relationship. This enables
the court, in its discretion, to preclude remedies that, on the specific facts
of the case, might place the injured employee in a better position than she
would have been in had the discrimination not occurred. In so doing, the
minority approach returns to the court what the majority approach fore-
closes-the opportunity to further congressional objectives by both root-
ing out discrimination in the workplace and compensating the plaintiff
for the injuries she has suffered.
229. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
230. See id.; Puhy v. Delta Air Lines, No. 1:91-CV-1630-RCF, 1993 WL 405426, at *5
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1993). The Supreme Court, in dicta, has supported this proposition.
See East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 n.9 (1977) ("Even
assuming, arguendo, that the company's failure even to consider the applications was
discriminatory, the company was entitled to prove at trial that the respondents had not
been injured because they were not qualified and would not have been hired in any
event."). Lower courts have agreed. See Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 728 F.2d 614,
626-27 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); Murnane v. American Airlines, 667
F.2d 98, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
231. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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